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Abstract  
The debate about the ethical implications of Artificial Intelligence dates from the 1960s (Wiener, 
1960) (Samuel, 1960). However, in recent years symbolic AI has been complemented and 
sometimes replaced by (Deep) Neural Networks and Machine Learning (ML) techniques. This has 
vastly increased its potential utility and impact on society, with the consequence that the ethical 
debate has gone mainstream. Such a debate has primarily focused on principles—the ‘what’ of AI 
ethics (beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, justice and explicability)—rather than on 
practices, the ‘how.’ Awareness of the potential issues is increasing at a fast rate, but the AI 
community’s ability to take action to mitigate the associated risks is still at its infancy. Therefore, 
our intention in presenting this research is to contribute to closing the gap between principles and 
practices by constructing a typology that may help practically-minded developers ‘apply ethics’ at 
each stage of the pipeline, and to signal to researchers where further work is needed. The focus is 
exclusively on Machine Learning, but it is hoped that the results of this research may be easily 
applicable to other branches of AI. The article outlines the research method for creating this 
typology, the initial findings, and provides a summary of future research needs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
1. Introduction 
 
As the availability of data on almost every aspect of life, and the sophistication of machine learning 
(ML) techniques, has increased (Lepri, Oliver, Letouzé, Pentland, & Vinck, 2018) so have the 
opportunities for improving both public and private life (Luciano Floridi & Taddeo, 2016). Society 
has greater control than it has ever had over outcomes related to: (1) who people can become; (2) 
what people can do;  (3) what people can achieve; and (4) how people can interact with the world 
(Floridi and colleagues, 2018a).  Yet, growing concerns about the ethical challenges posed by the 
increased use of ML in particular, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) more generally, in society, 
threaten to put a halt to the advancement of beneficial applications, including in data science 
(Mittelstadt, 2019), unless handled proportionately. 
 Balancing this tension between the need to support innovation, so that society’s right to 
benefit from science is protected (Knoppers & Thorogood, 2017), with the need to limit the 
potential harms associated with poorly-designed AI (and specifically ML in this context), 
(summarised in figure 1) is challenging. ML algorithms are powerful (Ananny & Crawford, 2018) 
socio-technical constructs that raise concerns that are as much (if not more) about people as they 
are about code (Crawford & Calo, 2016). Enabling the so-called dual advantage of ‘ethical ML’—
so that the opportunities are capitalised on, whilst the harms are foreseen and minimised or 
prevented (Floridi and colleagues. 2018)—requires asking difficult questions about design, 
development, deployment, practices, uses and users, as well as the data that fuel the whole process 
(Cath, Zimmer, Lomborg, & Zevenbergen, 2018). Lessig was right all along: code is both our 
greatest threat and our greatest promise (Lessig, 2006).  
 
Ethical Concern   Explanation  
Inconclusive Evidence   Algorithmic conclusions are probabilities and therefore not infallible. This can lead to 
unjustified actions. For example, an algorithm used to assess credit worthiness could 
be accurate 99% of the time, but this would still mean that one out of a hundred 
applicants would be denied credit wrongly.  
Inscrutable Evidence   A lack of interpretability and transparency can lead to algorithmic systems 
that are hard to control, monitor, and correct. This is the commonly cited ‘black-box’ 
issue.   
Misguided Evidence   Conclusions can only be as reliable (but also as neutral) as the data they are based 
on, and this can lead to bias. For example, Dressel & Farid, 2018 found that the 
COMPAS recidivism algorithm commonly used in pretrial, parole, and sentencing 
decisions in the United States, is no more accurate or fair than predictions made by 
people with little or no criminal justice expertise.  
Unfair outcomes   An action could be found to be discriminatory if it has a disproportionate impact on 
one group of people. For instance, Selbst, 2017 articulates how the adoption of 
predictive policing tools is leading to more people of colour being arrested, jailed or 
physically harmed by police.  
Transformative effects   Algorithmic activities, like profiling, can lead to challenges for autonomy and 
informational privacy. For example, Polykalas & Prezerakos, 2019 examined the level 
of access required to personal data by more than 1000 apps listed in the ‘most 
popular’ free and paid for categories on the Google Play Store. They found that free 
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apps requested significantly more data than paid-for apps, suggested that the business 
model of these ‘free’ apps is the exploitation of the personal data. 
Traceability   It is hard to assign responsibility to algorithmic harms and this can lead to issues with 
moral responsibility. For example, it may be unclear who (or indeed what) is 
responsible for autonomous car fatalities. An in depth ethical analysis of this specific 
issue is provided by (Hevelke & Nida-Rümelin, 2015) 
Figure 1: Ethical concerns related to algorithmic use based on the ‘map’ created by Mittelstadt and colleagues 
(2016).   
 
This might seem like an incredibly tall order. However, rising to the challenge is both essential and 
possible. Indeed, those that claim that it is impossible are falling foul of the is-ism fallacy where 
they confuse the way things are with the way things can be (Lessig 2006), or indeed should be. It 
is possible to design an algorithmically-enhanced society pro-ethically1 (Floridi 2017b), so that it 
protects the values, principles, and ethics that society thinks are fundamental (Floridi 2018). This 
is the message that social scientists, ethicists, philosophers, policymakers, technologists and civil 
society have been delivering in a collective call for the development of appropriate governance 
mechanisms (D’Agostino & Durante, 2018) that will enable society to capitalise on the 
opportunities, whilst ensuring that human rights are respected (Luciano Floridi & Taddeo, 2016), 
and fair and ethical decision-making is maintained (Lipton, 2016).  
The purpose of the following pages is to highlight the part that technologists, or ML 
developers, can take in this broader conversation. Specifically, section 2 discusses how efforts to 
date have been too focused on the ‘what’ of ethical AI (i.e. debates about principles and codes of 
conduct) and not enough on the ‘how’ of applied ethics. Section 3 outlines the research planned 
to contribute to closing this gap between principles and practice through the creation of an ‘applied 
ethical AI typology’, and the methodology for its creation. Section 4, summarises what the typology 
shows about the low availability and maturity, as well as skewed distribution, of tools and 
methodologies available for practical AI ethics. Section 5, argues that there is a need for a more 
coordinated effort, from multi-disciplinary researchers, innovators, policymakers, citizens, 
developers and designers, to create and evaluate new tools and methodologies, in order to ensure 
that there is a ‘how’ for every ‘what’ at each stage of the Machine Learning pipeline. Finally, section 
6, concludes that this will be challenging to achieve, but it would be imprudent not to try.  
 
                                                        
1 The difference between ethics by design and pro-ethical design is the following: ethics by design can be paternalistic in ways that constrain the 
choices of agents, because it makes some options less easily available or not at all; instead, pro-ethical design still forces agents to make choices, but 
this time the nudge is less paternalistic because it does not preclude a course of action but requires agents to make up their mind about it. A 
simple example can clarify the difference. A speed camera is a form of nudging (drivers should respect the speed limits) but it is pro-ethical 
insofar as it leaves to the drivers the freedom to choose to pay a ticket, for example in case of an emergency. On the contrary, in terms of ethics 
by design, speed bumps are a different kind of traffic calming measure designed to slow down vehicles and improve safety. They may seem like a 
good idea, but they involve a physical alteration of the road, which is permanent and leaves no real choice to the driver. This means that 
emergency vehicles, such as a medical ambulance, a police car, or a fire engine, must also slow down, even when responding to an emergency. 
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2. Moving from Principles to Practice  
As the call for ‘AI governance’ has got louder, the number of available Ethical Codes of Practice 
for AI has increased. Currently (April 2019), there are at least 70 publicly available sets of ethical 
principles and frameworks for AI2. The list includes documents produced by industry (Google3, 
IBM4, Microsoft5, Intel6), Government (Montreal Declaration7, Lords Select Committee8, 
European Commission’s High-Level Expert Group9), and academia (Future of Life Institute10, 
IEEE11, AI4People12). The hope is that these principles, as abstractions (Anderson & Anderson, 
2018), can act as normative constraints (Turilli, 2007) on the ‘do’s’ and ‘don’ts’ of algorithmic use 
in society. This is a worthwhile aim, and a necessary building block in the creation of an 
environment that fosters ethical, responsible, and beneficial AI. However, the mere existence of 
these principles does little to bring about actual change in the design of algorithmic systems, leading 
to accusations of ‘ethics washing’ and feelings of ‘ethics fatigue’ (Floridi 2019b). 
 The issue is that, whilst these principles—which (at least in Europe) are largely based on 
the bioethical principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, justice and autonomy, and the concept 
of ‘explicability’ (Floridi and colleagues, 2018)—provide a useful framework for what ethical AI 
looks like, they do not tell developers how to design it. The gap between principles and practice is 
simply too large. This is risky: unless mechanisms are developed to close this gap, the lack of 
guidance may (a) result in the costs of ethical mistakes outweighing the benefits of ethical successes 
(even a single critical ‘AI scandal’ could stifle innovation); (b) undermine public acceptance of 
                                                        
2 2 See these two repositories: Algorithm Watch. The AI Ethics Guidelines Global Inventory (9 April 2019): 
https://algorithmwatch.org/en/project/ai-ethics-guidelines-global-inventory/ and Winfield, A. (18 April 2019): An Updated Round Up of 
Ethical Principles of Robotics and AI. http://alanwinfield.blogspot.com/2019/04/an-updated-round-up-of-ethical.html 
 
3 Google’s AI Principles: https://www.blog.google/technology/ai/ai-principles/ 
 
4 IBM’s everyday ethics for AI: https://www.ibm.com/watson/assets/duo/pdf/everydayethics.pdf 
 
5 Microsoft’s guidelines for conversational bots: https://www.microsoft.com/en-
us/research/uploads/prod/2018/11/Bot_Guidelines_Nov_2018.pdf 
 
6 Intel’s recommendations for public policy principles on AI: https://blogs.intel.com/policy/2017/10/18/naveen-rao-announces-intel-ai-public-
policy/#gs.8qnx16 
 
7 The Montreal Declaration for Responsible AI: https://www.montrealdeclaration-responsibleai.com/the-declaration 
 
8 House of Lords Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence: AI in the UK: ready, willing and able?: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldai/100/100.pdf 
 
9 European Commission’s Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI: https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/ai-alliance-consultation/guidelines/1 
 
10 Future of Life’s Asilomar AI Principles: https://futureoflife.org/ai-principles/ 
 
11 IEEE General Principles of Ethical Autonomous and Intelligent Systems: http://alanwinfield.blogspot.com/2019/04/an-updated-round-up-
of-ethical.html 
 
12 Floridi, L. and colleagues. AI4People—An Ethical Framework for a Good AI Society: Opportunities, Risks, Principles, and Recommendations. 
Minds and Machines 28, 689-707, doi:10.1007/s11023-018-9482-5 (2018).   
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algorithmic systems; (c) reduce adoption of algorithmic systems; and (d) ultimately create a 
scenario in which society incurs significant opportunity costs (Cookson, 2018).  
 Avoiding these opportunity costs is crucial, and so the social need for means of translating 
between the ‘what’ (ethical principles) and the ‘how’ (technical requirements) (Dignum, 2017) is 
growing. Complexity, variability, subjectivity, and lack of standardisation, including variable 
interpretation of the ‘components’ of each of the ethical principles, make this challenging 
(Alshammari & Simpson, 2017). However, it is achievable if the right questions are asked (Green, 
2018)(Wachter, Mittelstadt, & Floridi, 2017a) and closer attention is payed to how the design 
process can influence (Kroll, 2018) whether an algorithm is more or less ‘ethically-aligned.’  Thus, 
this is the aim of this research project: to identify the methods and tools available to help 
developers, engineers and designers of ML specifically (but we hope the results of the this research 
may be easily applicable to other branches of AI) reflect on and apply ‘ethics’  (Adamson, Havens, 
& Chatila, 2019) so that they may know not only what to do or not to do, but also how to do it, 
or avoid doing it (Alshammari & Simpson, 2017). 
 
3. Methodology  
The first task was to design a typology of applied AI tools, for the very practically minded ML 
community (Holzinger, 2018), to embed reflection on the ethical principles of beneficence, non-
maleficence, autonomy, justice and explicability (Floridi and colleagues, 2018)) into the ML 
pipeline from pre-processing, to use by the end user (Holzinger, 2018). To do this, the ethical 
principles were combined with the stages of algorithmic development outlined in the overview of 
the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) auditing framework for artificial intelligence and 
its core components,13 as shown in Figure 2, to encourage ML developers to go between design 
decision and ethical principles regularly. 
  
                                                        
13More detail is available here:  https://ai-auditingframework.blogspot.com/2019/03/an-overview-of-auditing-framework-for_26.html 
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 Business and use-
case development  
Problem/improvements 
are defined and use of 
AI is proposed 
Design Phase 
The business case is 
turned into design 
requirements for 
engineers 
Training and test 
data procurement 
Initial data sets are 
obtained to train and 
test the model 
Building  
AI application is built  
Testing  
The system is tested 
Deployment 
When the AI system goes live 
Monitoring 
Performance of the 
system is assessed  
Beneficence 
Value-alignment  
Responsible design 
       
Non-Maleficence 
Privacy by design 
Secure by default 
Robustness 
(Cavoukian, Taylor, 
& Abrams, 2010) 
outline 7 foundational 
principles for Privacy 
by Design:  
1.Proactive not reactive: 
preventative not 
reactive.  
2.Privacy as the default 
3.Privacy embedded 
into design 
4.Full functionality = 
positive sum, not zero 
sum  
5.End-to-End Lifecyle 
protection  
6.Visibility and 
Transparency  
7.Respect for user 
privacy  
(Oetzel & 
Spiekermann, 2014) 
set out a step-by-step 
privacy impact 
assessment (PIA) to 
enable companies to 
achieve ‘privacy-by-
design.’   
 
(Antignac, Sands, 
& Schneider, 2016) 
provide the python 
code to create 
DataMin (a data 
minimiser – a pre-
processor modifying 
the input of data to 
ensure only the data 
needed are available 
to the program) as a 
series of Java source 
code files which can 
be run on the data 
source points before 
disclosing the data. 
(Kolter & Madry, 
2018) provide a 
practical introduction, 
from a mathematical 
and coding 
perspective, to the 
topic of adversarial 
robustness with the 
idea being that it is 
possible to train deep 
learning classifiers to 
be resistant to 
adversarial attacks: 
https://adversarial-
ml-tutorial.org/ 
 
(Dennis, Fisher, 
Lincoln, Lisitsa, & 
Veres, 2016) outline 
a methodology for 
verifying the 
decision-making of 
an autonomous 
agent to confirm that 
the controlling agent 
never deliberately 
makes a choice it 
believes to be 
unsafe. 
 
The AI Now Institute 
Algorithmic Accountability 
Policy Toolkit,  provides a list 
of questions policy and legal 
advocates will want to ask 
when considering introducing 
an automated system into a 
public service and provides 
detailed advice on how where 
in the procurement process to 
ask questions about 
accountability and potential 
harm.   
https://ainowinstitute.org/aap-
toolkit.pdf  
 
(Makri & 
Lambrinoudakis, 
2015) outline a 
structured privacy 
audit procedure based 
on the most widely 
adopted privacy 
principles: 
- Purpose 
specification 
- Collection limitation 
- Data quality 
- Use, retention and 
disclosure limitation 
- Safety safeguards 
- Openness  
- Individual 
participation  
- Accountability 
Autonomy 
Exercising of rights 
       
Justice  
Fairness  
Compliance 
       
Explicability 
Accountability  
Intelligibility  
Transparency   
       
Figure 2: ‘Applied AI Ethics’ Typology comprising ethical principles from Floridi and colleagues (2018) and the ICO’s 
Auditing Framework for Artificial Intelligence with illustrative ‘non-maleficent’ example 
 
The second task was to conduct a thorough literature review (in Scopus14 and arXiv15) and Internet 
search using the terms outlined in Figure 3. The original search returned more than 800 results. A 
review of the abstracts or website introductions was then conducted to refine this list (articles, 
blogs, reports, websites, online resources and conference papers were checked for relevance, 
actionability by ML developers and generalisability across industry sectors) to 253 sources that 
provide a practical or theoretical contribution to the answer of the question: ‘how to develop an 
ethical algorithmic system.’  
  
                                                        
14 Scopus is the largest abstract and citation database of peer-reviewed literature: scientific journals, books and conference proceedings: 
https://www.scopus.com/home.uri 
 
15Arxiv provides open access to 1,532,009 e-prints in the fields of physics, mathematics, computer science, quantitative biology, quantitative 
finance, statistics, electrical engineering and systems science, and economics: https://arxiv.org/ 
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Search Term(s) Number of saved Scopus results Date of search  
Public Perception 3 14/02/2019 
Intellectual Property  10 14/02/2019 
Business Model  3 14/02/2019 
Evaluation  7 14/02/2019 
Data Sharing Agreement 1 14/02/2019 
GDPR  33 13/02/2019 
Impact Assessment  6 13/02/2019 
Counterfactuals  59 13/02/2019 
Privacy by design  18 13/02/2019 
Data minimisation  18 13/02/2019 
Bias  5 13/02/2019 
Harm  18 13/02/2019 
Responsible Technology  231 12/02/2019 
Regulation  47 06/02/2019 
Ethical  120 05/02/2019 
 
Figure 3: Full list of terms used for literature search (Number of saved results from Scopus listed). All were searched with 
AND Machine Learning OR Artificial Intelligence OR AI  
 
The third, and final task, was to review the recommendations, theories, methodologies, and tools 
outlined in the reviewed sources, and identify where they may fit in the typology. The ultimate 
ambition is to ensure that there is a choice of mature tools in each box of the typology (this is not 
the case currently), so that ML developers have aids to ethically-informed design at each stage of 
the process. For example, as illustrated in figure 2, a developer looking to ensure their ML 
algorithm is ‘non-maleficent’ (unlikely to cause harm related to privacy or security issues) can start 
with the foundational principles of privacy by design (Cavoukian and colleagues, 2010) to guide 
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ideation appropriately, use techniques such as data minimisation (Antignac and colleagues, 2016), 
training for adversarial robustness (Kolter & Madry, 2018), and decision-making verification 
(Dennis and colleagues, 2016) in the train-build-test phases, and end by launching the system with 
an accompanying privacy audit procedure (Makri & Lambrinoudakis, 2015).  
What is revealing about this example, and what makes it illustrative of one of the 
overarching limitations of many of the tools included in the typology, is that all the techniques 
referenced are currently in the academic research stage and, although promising, they require more 
work before being ‘production-ready.’ This current lack of ‘market-testing’ means that applying 
ethics still requires considerable amounts of effort on behalf of the ML developers (even when 
there are open-source code libraries available documentation is often limited and the skill-level 
required for use is high), undermining one of the main aims of developing and using 
technologically-based ‘tools’: to remove friction from applied ethics.  
The full typology is available here [ https://tinyurl.com/AppliedAIEthics ]. It is important 
to note that the purpose of presenting it is not to imply that it is ‘complete’ nor that the tools and 
methodologies highlighted are the best, or indeed the only, means of ‘solving’ each of the 
individual ethical problems. It is more a proof of concept.  How to apply ethics to the development 
of ML is an open question that can be solved in a multitude of different ways at different scales 
and in different contexts (Floridi, 2019a). Instead, the goal is to provide a brief snapshot of what 
tools are currently available to ML developers to encourage the progression of ethical AI from 
principles to practice and to signal clearly, to the ‘ethical AI’ community at large, where further 
work is needed.  It is with the intention of starting this conversation that  an overview of the 
findings is presented in the next section.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Heatmap of the ‘Applied AI Ethics’ Typology. Darker shades of blue represent more densely populated areas of 
the typology and grey represents ‘blank space.’  
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4. Initial Findings 
 
It is evident, by simply looking at the typology (see figure 4 above), that interest in the practice of 
‘ethical ML’, and thus the availability of tools and methods, is not evenly distributed across the 
ML pipeline. Currently, most attention for all the ethical principles is focused on interventions at 
the early input stages (Binns, 2018b) (business and use-case development, design phase and 
training and test data procurement) or at the model testing phases. For example, the review failed 
to identify tools16 or methods for ensuring value-alignment (beneficence) at the deployment stage, 
and found very few tools or methods for promoting autonomy (the user’s ability to exercise their 
rights (Floridi and colleagues, 2018)) during the middle building and testing phases. Several factors 
may have influenced this skewed distribution of interest, but three are likely to have been more 
influential: 
1. at least in Europe, the introduction of the European General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR)17;  
2. a focus on the need to ‘protect’ the individual over the collective; and 
3. the lack of clarity around definitions of key terms. 
 
They are interrelated, but for the sake of simplicity let us analyse each separately. 
 
4.1 Legislative influence    
In Europe, the introduction of the GDPR in May 2018, with its threat of large fines for 
inappropriate collection or processing of data18 and supposed right to an explanation (Wachter, 
Mittelstadt, & Floridi, 2017b) has clearly had a significant impact on the ML research community, 
concentrating attention on methods to ensure non-maleficence (privacy and security), autonomy 
(consent), and post-hoc explanations. This is understandable but concerning. 
The GDPR may, like all regulation, prove to have unintended consequences in terms of 
incentivising some types of research over others and promoting minimum adherence over best 
practice. For example, it has clearly encouraged a focus on privacy and explicability over the 
promotion of autonomy in design choices and done very little to encourage competition to be the 
most ethical system (Luciano Floridi, 2018). The risk is that being compliant may be seen to be 
good enough. This is evident in the case of the ‘the right to an explanation’, where a focus on 
achieving what can be termed a minimum-viable-explanation has encouraged the ML research 
                                                        
16 The word “failed” is used because it is important to note that this does not mean that such tools do not exist, but that they did not come up in 
our search, are available only as proprietary solutions, or are currently only available in theory and not in practice. 
17 The GDPR can be viewed in full here: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1532348683434&uri=CELEX:02016R0679-
20160504 
18 A guide to the implications of the GDPR is provided by the ICO here: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-
to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/ 
 
 10 
community to focus on mechanisms that can inform users (Wachter, Mittelstadt, & Floridi, 2017b) 
in a simplified manner of how the inputs are related to the outputs. This may be necessary but is 
not sufficient, because such mechanisms—e.g. LIME (Ribeiro, Singh, & Guestrin, 2016), SHAP 
(Lundberg & Lee, 2017), Sensitivity Analysis (Oxborough and colleagues, 2018)—do not really 
succeed in helping developers provide meaningful (Edwards & Veale, 2018) explanations that give 
individuals greater control over what is being inferred about them from their data.  
 
4.2 An individual focus  
Few of the available tools surveyed provide meaningful ways to assess, and respond to, the impact 
that the data-processing involved in their ML algorithm has on an individual, and even less on the 
impact on society as a whole (Poursabzi-Sangdeh, Goldstein, Hofman, Vaughan, & Wallach, 
2018). This is evident from the very sparsely populated ‘deployment’ column of the typology. Its 
emptiness implies that the need for pro-ethically designed human-computer interaction (at an 
individual level) or networks of ML systems (at a group level) has been paid little heed. This is 
most likely because it is very difficult to translate complex human behaviour into simple to use, 
generalisable design tools. 
This might not seem particularly important, but the impact this has on the overall 
acceptance of AI in society could be significant. For example,  it is unlikely that counterfactual 
explanations19 (i.e. if input variable x  had been different, the output variable y would have been 
different as well) will do anything to improve the interpretability of recommendations made by 
black-box systems for the average member of the public or the technical community. If such 
methods become the de facto means of providing ‘explanations,’ the extent to which the ‘algorithmic 
society’ is interpretable to the general public will be very limited. And counterfactual explanations 
could easily be embraced by actors uninterested in providing factual explanations, because the 
counterfactual ones provide a vast menu of options, which may easily decrease the level of 
responsibility of the actor choosing it. For example, if a mortgage provider does not offer a 
mortgage, the factual reason may be a bias, for example the gender of the applicant, but the 
provider could choose from a vast menu of innocuous, counterfactual explanations—if some 
variable x had been different the mortgage might have bene provided—e.g., a much higher 
income, more collaterals, lower amount, and so forth, without ever mentioning the gender of the 
applicant. All this could considerably limit the level of trust people are willing to place in such 
systems.  
                                                        
19 See for example (Wachter, Mittelstadt, & Russell, 2017) (Johansson, Shalit, & Sontag, 2016) (Lakkaraju, Kleinberg, Leskovec, Ludwig, & 
Mullainathan, 2017) (Russell, Kusner, Loftus, & Silva, 2017). 
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 This potential threat to trust is further heightened by the fact that the lack of attention 
paid to impact means that ML developers are currently hampered in their ability to develop systems 
that promote user’s (individual or group’s) autonomy. For example, currently there is an 
assumption that prediction = decision, and little research has been done (in the context of ML) on 
how people translate predictions into actionable decisions. As such, tools that, for example, help 
developers pro-ethically design solutions that do not overly restrict the user’s options in acting on 
this prediction (i.e. tools that promote the user’s autonomy) are in short supply (Kleinberg, 
Lakkaraju, Leskovec, Ludwig, & Mullainathan, 2017). If users feel as though their decisions are 
being too curtailed and controlled by systems that they do not understand, it is very unlikely that 
these systems will meet the condition of social acceptability, never mind the condition of social 
preferability which should be the aim for truly ethically designed ML (Luciano Floridi & Taddeo, 
2016).  
 
4.3 A lack of consistency   
Producing tools to fill in the white space on the typology is likely to be challenging. There is a 
distinct lack of agreement on what the aims of such tools would be. Key terms such as ‘fairness’ 
(Friedler, Scheidegger, & Venkatasubramanian, 2016) (Kleinberg, Mullainathan, & Raghavan, 
2016) (Overdorf, Kulynych, Balsa, Troncoso, & Gürses, 2018), ‘accountability’, ‘transparency’ 
(Ananny & Crawford, 2018) (Turilli & Floridi, 2009), and ‘interpretability’ (Doshi-Velez & Kim, 
2017) (Guidotti and colleagues. 2018) (Bibal & Frénay, 2016) have myriad definitions, and 
sometimes (e.g. in the case of ‘fairness’) many statistical implementations that are not compatible 
and require informed decisions about trade-offs. Indeed, in some instances, definitions of the same 
concept directly contradict each other (Friedler and colleagues. 2016) and recently there has even 
been debate as to whether black boxes are as problematic as popular opinion makes them out to 
be (Holm, 2019). This makes it almost impossible to measure the impact, ‘define success’, and 
document the performance (Mitchell and colleagues. 2019) of a new design methodology or tool. 
Without a clear business case, that is, in the absence of a clear problem statement and a clear 
outcome, it is hard for the ML community to justify time and financial investment in developing 
these much-needed tools and techniques.  
This issue stems from the fact that the entire field is imbued with subjectivity (Bibal & 
Frénay, 2016) and the relative success of ethical-alignment—from ideation through to operation 
at scale—is also context-dependent. Yet there seem to be few tools available to help ML 
developers deal with this subjectivity and associated complexity. For example, at the “beneficence 
® use-case ® design” intersection, there are a number of tools highlighted to help elicit social 
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values. These include the responsible research and innovation methodology employed by the 
European Commission’s Human Brain Project (Stahl & Wright, 2018),  the field guide to human-
centred design,20 and Involve and DeepMind’s guidance on stimulating effective public 
engagement on the ethics of artificial intelligence.21  However, although they are useful, such 
methods offer limited guidance on how to deal with value pluralism (i.e. variation in values across 
different population groups). Without this guidance, the values that are embedded and protected 
by design tools are likely to be perceived as imposed and paternalistic, and restricted to those of 
the groups in society that have the loudest voices. In other words, there has been little attention 
paid to the potential for ‘value bias’ to develop at scale. 
 
5. A way forward  
Social scientists (Matzner, 2014) and political philosophers (from Rousseau and Kant, to Rawls 
and Habermas) (Binns, 2018a), are used to dealing with the kind of plurality outlined in section 4, 
and to thinking about the interaction between individual level and group level ‘ethics.’ This is why 
Nissenbaum argues for a contextual account of privacy, one that recognises the varying nature of 
informational norms (Matzner, 2014) and Kemper & Kolkman, (2018) state that transparency is 
only meaningful in the context of a defined critical audience. However, the ML developer 
community may be less used to dealing with this kind of complexity, and more used to scenarios 
where there is at least a seemingly quantifiable relationship between input and output. As a result, 
the existing approaches to designing and programming ethical ML fail to resolve what Arvan, 2018 
terms the moral-semantic trilemma, as almost all tools and methods highlighted in the typology 
are either too semantically strict, too semantically flexible, or overly unpredictable (Arvan, 2018).  
Overcoming this nervousness of social complexity, embracing uncertainty, and accepting 
that: (1) AI is built on assumptions; (2) human behaviour is complex; (3) algorithms can have 
unfair consequences; (4) algorithmic predictions can be hard to interpret (Vaughan & Wallach, 
2016); (5) trade-offs may be inevitable; and (6) positive, ethical features are open to progressive 
increase but are not bounded between 0 and 1 (e.g., an algorithm can be increasingly fair, and fairer 
than another algorithm or a previous version, but makes no sense to say that it is fair 100% in 
absolute terms, compare this to the case of speed: it makes sense to say that an object is moving 
quickly, or that it is fast or faster than another, but not that it is fast 100%), is likely to be highly 
beneficial for the development of applied ethical tools and methodologies for at least three reasons.  
                                                        
20 http://www.designkit.org/resources/1 
 
21 https://bit.ly/2HKNtPh 
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First, embracing uncertainty will naturally encourage ML developers to ask more probing 
and open (i.e., philosophical) questions (Luciano Floridi, 2019b) that will lead to more nuanced 
and reasoned answers and hence decisions about why and when certain trade-offs, for example, 
between accuracy and interpretability (Goodman & Flaxman, 2017), are justified, based on factors 
such as proportionality to risk (Holm, 2019). Second, it will encourage a more flexible and reflexive 
approach to applied ethics that is more in-keeping with the way ML systems are actually developed: 
it is not think then code, but rather think and code. In other words, it will encourage a move away 
from the ‘move fast and break things’ approach towards an approach of ‘make haste slowly’ (festina 
lente) (Luciano Floridi, 2019a) . Finally, it would also mitigate a significant risk posed by the current 
sporadic application of ethical-design tools and/or methods during different development stages, 
of the ethical principles having been written into the business and use-case, but coded out by the 
time a system gets to deployment.  
To enable developers to embrace this valuable uncertainty, it will be important to 
promote the development of tools, like DotEveryone’s agile consequence scanning event,22 that 
prompt developers to reflect on the impacts (both direct and indirect) of the solutions they are 
developing on the ‘end user’, and on how these impacts can be altered by seemingly minor 
design decisions at each stage of development. In other words, ML developers should regularly  
a. look back and ask: ‘if I was abiding by ethical principles x in my design then, am I still 
now?’ (as encouraged by Wellcome Data Lab’s agile methodology (Mikhailov, 2019) and  
b. look forward and ask: ‘if I am abiding by ethical principles x in my design now, should I 
continue to do so? And how?’ by using foresight methodologies (Taddeo & Floridi, 2018) 
(Floridi & Strait, forthcoming)such as AI Now’s Algorithmic Impact Assessment 
Framework (Reisman, Schultz, Crawford, & Whittaker, 2018)).   
Taking this approach recognises that, in a digital context, ethical principles are not simply either 
applied or not, but they are regularly re-applied or applied differently, or better, or ignored as 
algorithmic systems are developed, deployed, configured (Ananny & Crawford, 2018) tested, 
revised and re-tuned (Arnold & Scheutz, 2018).  
 Although clearly beneficial, this approach to applied ML ethics of regular reflection and 
application will not be possible unless (i) the skewed distribution of tools in the typology is 
balanced out and (ii) acceleration of tools maturity level from research labs into production 
environments. To achieve (i)-(ii), society needs to come together in communities comprised of 
multi-disciplinary researchers (Cath, Wachter, Mittelstadt, Taddeo, & Floridi, 2017),  innovators, 
                                                        
22 Full details of DotEveryone’s Consequence Scanning Event: https://doteveryone.org.uk/project/consequence-scanning/ 
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policymakers, citizens, developers and designers (Taddeo & Floridi, 2018) to foster the 
development of: (1) common knowledge and understanding; and (2) a common goal to be 
achieved from the development of tools and methodologies for applied AI ethics (Durante, 2010). 
These outputs will provide a reason, a mechanism, and a consensus to coordinate the efforts 
behind tool development. Ultimately, this will produce better results than the current approach, 
which allows a 'thousand flowers to bloom' but fails to create tools that fill in the gaps (this is a 
typical ‘intellectual market’ failure), and may encourage competition to produce preferable options. 
The opportunity that this presents is too great for us to wait, the ML research community should 
start collaborating now with a specific focus on:  
1. creation of tools that ensure people, as individuals, groups and societies are given an 
equal and meaningful opportunity to participate in the design of algorithmic solutions 
at each stage of development;  
2. evaluation of the tools that are currently in existence so that what works, what can be 
improved, and what needs to be developed can be identified;  
3. commitment to reproducibility, openness, and sharing of knowledge and technical 
solutions (e.g., software), also in view of satisfying (1) and supporting (2); 
4. evaluation and creation of pro-ethical business models and incentive structures that 
balance the costs and rewards of investing in ethical AI across society, also in view of 
supporting (1)-(3).  
 
6.  Conclusion  
The realisation that there is a need to embed ethical considerations into the design of 
computational, specifically algorithmic, artefacts is not new. Both Alan Turing and Norbert Weiner 
were vocal about this in the 1940s and 1960s (Turilli, 2008). However, as the complexity of 
algorithmic systems and our reliance on them increases (Cath and colleagues. 2017), so too does 
the need to be critical of pro-ethical (Floridi, 2016) AI governance (Cath, 2018) and design 
solutions. It is possible to design things to be better (Floridi, 2017), but this will require more 
coordinated and sophisticated approaches (Allen, Varner, & Zinser, 2000) to translating ethical 
principles into design protocols (Turilli, 2007). 
 This call for increased coordination is necessary as this research has shown that there is a 
skewed distribution of effort across the ‘Applied AI Ethics’ typology. Furthermore, many of the 
tools included are relatively immature. This makes it difficult to assess the scope of their use 
(resulting in Arvan’s 2018 ‘moral-semantic trilemma’) and consequently hard to encourage their 
 15 
adoption by the practically-minded ML developers, especially when the competitive advantage of 
more ethically-aligned AI is not yet clear.  
 Constructive patience needs to be exercised, by society and by the ethical AI community, 
because the question of ‘how’ to meet the ‘what’ will not be solved overnight, and there will 
definitely be mistakes along the way. The ML research community will have to accept this, trust 
that everyone is trying to meet the same end-goal but also accept that it is unacceptable to delay 
any full commitment, when it is known how serious the consequences of doing nothing are. Only 
by accepting this can society be positive about the opportunities presented by AI to be seized, 
whilst remaining mindful of the potential costs to be avoided (Floridi and colleagues. 2018). 
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